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Abstract Language can be used to bridge the gap between expert knowledge and
ability to act. I argue that this function is grammaticalized in imperatives (and
in some languages, larger paradigms of directives), and that this becomes evident
in restrictions on the (co-)reference of their subjects. I develop an account of the
conventional semantics of imperatives and directives in general that associates the
prohibited constellations with conflicting discourse requirements.
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1 Introduction
The imperative clauses of any given language are commonly identified as the sen-
tential form types that are prototypically used for ordering. Orders are a form of
directive speech acts, which can be defined as ‘attempts [. . . ] by the speaker to get
the hearer to do something’ (Searle 1976: 11). (1) exemplifies different strategies
of marking imperative( clause)s, including syntactic means as in English, verbal
morphology as in Japanese and Slovenian, a combination thereof in German, or
sentence-final particles as in Korean.
(1) a. Read this book! English
b. Kono
this
hon-o
book-ACC
yom-e!
read-IMP
Japanese
c. Preberi
read.IMP
to
this.F.SG.ACC
knjigo!
book.F.SG.ACC
Slovenian
d. Lies
read.IMP
dieses
this
Buch!
book
German
e. I
this
chayk-ul
book-ACC
ilk-ela.
read-IMP
Korean
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From the use of a Searlean definition of directive speech acts as the heuristic for the
individuation of imperatives across languages, it follows that, on their canonical use,
they involve the utterance speaker and addressee in two roles that I will director and
instigator, respectively. When examining the most typical of the thus individuated
forms (see Sect. 2.2 for others), it stands out that across the different formal marking
strategies there is a grammatical connection with the addressee: the addressee is
the referent of the often covert grammatical subject (Aikhenvald 2010: 66), which
can be realized overtly for emphasis or contrast. This is exemplified in (2), where
the reflexive bound by the subject bears second person marking independently of
whether there is an overt subject.1
(2) Wasch
wash.SG.IMP
{
{
/0,
/0,
du
2.NOM
}
}
dich!
2SG.REFL
‘(You) wash yourself!’
I refer to the thus individuated forms as canonical (second person) imperatives, and
their behavior can be summarized as in (3):
(3) Canonical imperative ‘φ !’ (with prejacent φ ) in its prototypical use:
a. The utterance speaker plays the role of a director, who selects and
promotes the course of events described by φ .
b. The utterance addressee is the instigator, who sees to it that (or, causes)
the course of events described by φ
c. The grammatical subject of φ refers to the utterance addressee.2
The restriction on the grammatical subject has received considerable attention in
the literature, and is sometimes considered definitional for canonical imperatives
(Ammann & van der Auwera 2004). Following the standard view, I assume that this
link is determined by the grammar. It is more controversial to what degree speech
act related aspects are part of what is encoded linguistically, and if so, if this happens
at the level of compositional semantics (and could thus feed into the composition
of larger linguistic entities) or post-compositionally (in terms of use conditions that
guide updates in a discourse model).3 Accounts differ specifically in which (if any)
1 In some languages such ‘second person’ imperative forms can occur with quantifiers or third person
referential expressions like proper names as subjects (e.g. Nobody moves!; Kids, Sebastian open the
door and Tobias put away the toys.). Downing (1969) claims that the subject of an English imperative
has to refer to (an element of), or quantify over, the (set of) addressee(s). In Kaufmann 2012, I defend
his claim against Potsdam 1998 and Zanuttini, Pak & Portner 2012, and provide an analysis that
constrains imperative subjects to referential or quantificational expressions that are, or can be mapped
to, quantifiers over (subsets of) the set of addressees.
2 Or quantifies over (a subset of) the set of addressees, see Fn. 1.
3 Speech act related meaning at the compositional level is adopted a.o. by Kamp (1978), Krifka (2014),
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of the prototypical links between grammatical subject, instigator, and addressee are
encoded conventionally, and even more so, if the speaker (or, in terms of role, the
director) appears in the syntax or the semantics of imperative clauses.4
In the following, I argue that canonical imperative clauses are the central players
in a possibly larger paradigm of directive clauses, which languages grammaticalize
to close with linguistic means a gap between presumed expert knowledge and the
power to realize a presumed optimal course of events. To develop this point, I turn
to embedded imperatives and imperative-like directives (surrogate imperatives). I
focus on the parameter of the director and show the grammatical impact of this role
in connection with the value of subject and instigator in the form of a co-reference
restriction (directive obviation). I develop an account for these data that is compatible
with a syntactic representation of the director but does not require it–as long (i) as
the linguistic structure contains some element(s) that encode(s) speech act related
meanings that reference the director, and (ii) the parameter of who counts as the
director can be influenced by switches in perspective as associated with interrogative
formation or attitude reports.
2 Canonical imperatives as part of linguistic systems
The recent literature on imperatives emphasizes the need to consider canonical
second person imperatives in the context of larger linguistic structures as well as in
comparison with other forms that overlap or are closely related in function (Alcázar
& Saltarelli 2014; von Fintel & Iatridou 2017).
2.1 Embedded imperatives
Contrary to what has long been the received wisdom on imperative clauses, in
many languages the morpho-syntactic form elements characteristic of canonical
matrix imperatives can appear in the syntactic and semantic scope of other linguistic
material. Complements of indirect speech reports constitute the most wide-spread
such context, exemplified in (4)–(6):
Murray (2014), Starr (2011). For imperatives specifically, Portner (2007) and Rudin (2018) propose
post-compositional speech act related meanings in the form of use-conditions and as moves in Farkas
& Bruce’s (2010) Table Model, respectively.
4 Accounts that do not assume the speaker or director to be linguistically encoded in any way include
Hausser 1980, Huntley 1984, Han 1999, Han 2000, Portner 2005, Portner 2007, Barker 2010,
von Fintel & Iatridou 2017. In contrast, the speaker plays a role in the conventional meanings
assigned in Bierwisch 1980, Schwager 2006, Kaufmann 2012, Eckardt 2011, Condoravdi & Lauer
2012, and Oikonomou 2016 a.o. Isac (2015) sees no evidence for the speaker’s syntactic relevance
in imperative clauses, whereas Alcázar & Saltarelli (2014) and Stegovec (2019) argue in favor of a
syntactic representation.
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(4) Rekel
said.M
(ti)
(2.DAT)
je,
is
da
that
mu
3.M.DAT
pomagaj.
help.IMP.(2)
‘Hei said (to you) that you should help himi,k.’
Slovenian, Sheppard & Golden (2002)
(5) Hans
Hans
hat
has
gesagt
said
ruf
call.IMP
seinen
his
Vater
father
an.
up
‘Hansi said that you should call hisi,l father.’ %German, Schwager (2006)
(6) Johni said call hisi,k father. %English, Crnicˇ & Trinh (2009)
With some speaker variation, the German and English examples are ambiguous
between direct and indirect speech reports. The direct speech construal can be
excluded on semantic grounds when indexicals are interpreted with respect to the
actual utterance context (for further tests, see Crnicˇ & Trinh 2009). In Slovenian, no
such ambiguity results thanks to the non-quotative complementizer da.5
Before comparing them to matrix imperatives, it is worth noting that languages
differ in what counts as the ‘addressee’ picked out by the grammatical subject.
Speech reports involve two utterance contexts, the reporting context in which the
report is made (absent further embedding, the actual utterance context), as well as the
context that is being described (reported context). With that, they involve an actual
and a reported addressee. Kaufmann (2014) shows that languages differ in which
of the two is referenced by the subject of an embedded imperative: for instance,
Slovenian second person imperatives relate to the actual addressee (Stegovec &
Kaufmann 2015), Korean imperatives relate to the reported addressee (Portner
2007). For speakers of English who accept imperatives in indirect speech, either
reading seems possible. In (7), the indicated interpretation of the indexicals ensures
a construal as indirect speech, and (7a) favors interpreting the embedded subject as
referring to the actual addressee (Peter), (7b) to the addressee of the reported context
(Mary):
(7) a. [Context: Peter’s visa is about to expire. Mary tells him:]
Ii talked to a lawyer yesterday, and he said marry myi sister.
b. [Context: Mary has lost her wallet. She tells her husband:]
I talked to John, and hei said call hisi bank.
Stegovec & Kaufmann (2015) attribute these cross-linguistic differences to non-
5 Embedded imperatives are also attested for instance in Old Scandinavian (Rögnvaldsson 1998),
Japanese (Han 1999; Oshima 2006; Schwager 2006), Korean (Pak, Portner & Zanuttini 2008), and
Mbyá (Guillaume 2012). However, not all languages allow for embedding of imperatives in indirect
speech: examples as in (4) to (6) seem to be unavailable for instance in Greek, French, Italian, or
Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian. So far, little is known about what properties this correlates with; Portner,
Pak & Zanuttini (2019) suggest to relate it to contextual anchoring as required by politeness marking.
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shiftable, obligatorily shifting, and optionally shifting indexicality in the imperative
subject marking.6
2.2 Other directives
After an initial focus on canonical second person imperatives,7 more recent works
on the semantics of imperative clauses emphasize the relevance of other forms in
imperative-like usages (surrogate imperatives). Canonical and surrogate imperatives
together constitute the class of directive clauses (or directives).
Alternatives to canonical morphosyntactic imperative marking are employed to
form negative imperatives in languages where morphosyntactic imperative marking
cannot co-occur with negation. Italian, for instance, employs infinitivals as in (8).8
(8) Leggi!
read.IMP2
–
–
Non
not
{leggere,
read.INF,
*leggi}.
read.IMP2
‘Read!’ – ‘Don’t read!’ Italian
Moreover, some languages employ alternative forms for directions formulated with
prejacents whose subjects don’t refer to the addressee(s).9 For instance, in Bhojpuri,
second person imperatives belong to a morphological paradigm that also contains
first and third person forms as in (9) (Zanuttini et al. 2012); Slovenian employs
subjunctives as in (10).
(9) Tebulwa:
table-NOM
sa:ph
clean-NOM
rahe!
be-IMP3Sg
‘Let the table be clean!’ Bhojpuri, (Zanuttini et al. 2012)
(10) Naj
SBJV
pomaga!
help.3
‘(S)he should help!’ Slovenian, naj-subjunctive
We might ask how these pass our definition of imperatives (or: directives) as, on
their protoypical use, expressing orders to the addressee to see to it that a certain
course of events be realized. In our terms, this implies that even if the grammatical
subject is a third person expression that does not refer to the addressee, it is still the
latter who plays the role of the instigator. Zanuttini et al. (2012) consider this part of
the conventional meaning of a form like (9) and call these ‘third person imperatives’
6 In German, indirect speech reports with imperatives are possible only if the two contexts share the
same addressee, (Kaufmann & Poschmann 2013).
7 For exceptions, see for instance the discussions of let’s in Davies 1986 and Mastop 2005.
8 Given that the incompatibility between imperative marking and negation is not universal, most authors
propose a syntactic solution (e.g. Zanuttini 1997; Zeiljstra 2006; Isac 2015).
9 Or quantify over (subsets of) the set of addressees, see Fn. 1.
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(similarly Isac 2015 for Romanian subjunctives). For Slovenian, Stegovec (2019)
argues that it is not part of the conventional meaning that the addressee is the
instigator, but typically the inference will arise that the addressee is expected to
contribute to the realization of the prejacent (for instance, by conveying a message to
the referent of the subject). As the heuristic of association with ordering is concerned
with prototypical use only, both takes are compatible with classifying such cases as
third person imperatives or directives.
The cases discussed so far serve to fill gaps where the regular morphosyntactic
marking of second person imperatives cannot be used. However, surrogate impera-
tives can also appear in what seems to be free variation with canonical second person
imperatives, as witnessed by Greek na-subjunctives and Slovenian da-clauses. How-
ever, the cases of that type that have been discussed in the literature all display slight
differences in functional type (unlike the cases in (8)–(10)). For Greek, Oikonomou
(2016) shows that na-subjunctives with second person subjects and morphological
imperatives differ with respect to default temporal interpretation and in whether
they can be used for wishes (Fn. 16). Another subclass of surrogate imperatives
is confined to command-like uses of imperatives (strong directives, von Fintel &
Iatridou 2017), as for instance Slovenian da-clauses.
(11) Greek:
a. Trekse
run.IMP
tora
now
amesos!
immediately
imperative
b. Na
SBJV
treksis
run
tora
now
amesos!
immediately
na-subjunctive
‘Run right now!’ command, invitation, advice,. . .
(12) Slovenian
a. Pojdi
go.IMP
levo!
left
imperative
‘Go left!’
b. Da
that
mi
1.DAT
greš
go.2
levo!
left
da-clause;
‘Go left!’ only command
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Person Sg Pl
1(Excl) naj pomaga-m naj pomaga-mo
I should help we.EXCL should help
1+2 – pomaga-j-mo
(we.INCL) let’s help
2 pomaga-j pomaga-j-te
(you.SG) help! (you.PL) help!
3 naj pomaga naj pomag-jo
(s)he should help they should help
Table 1 Slovenian directive paradigm (dual forms pattern with plurals)
3 Directive obviation
3.1 Slovenian directives: imperatives and naj-subjunctives
Slovenian verbs have inflectional forms for second person singular, dual, and plural,
as well as first person inclusive10 dual and plural imperatives. Stegovec (2019)
argues that subjunctive forms (marked with the particle naj and regular indicative
person morphology) fill in a full person paradigm of directive clauses (cf. Table 1):
they serve for non-constative speech acts which typically aim at getting the addressee
(possibly together with others) to influence the course of events in the way specified.
In addition to their functional similarity, Stegovec (2019) points out that these forms
jointly participate in a pattern of person restrictions that I call directive obviation:11
in main clauses, their distribution is constrained by utterance function (directing vs.
asking), in embedded clauses, it is constrained by the reference of the matrix subject.
When directives are used for orders, requests, advice, or the like, their subject
can be second person as in regular imperative clauses, first person inclusive (some-
times labeled exhortatives), or third person. However, first person exclusive forms
(singular or plural) are ungrammatical:
(13) Main clause directive: anyone but first person exclusive.
a. *Naj
SBJV
pomagam!
help.1
–
–
*Naj
SBJV
pomagamo!
help.1Pl
int.: ‘I should help!’ – int.: ‘We should help!’
10 First person inclusive expresses reference to the speaker and addressee(s) (and possibly others)
together, first person exclusive to the speaker (and possibly individuals other than the addressee(s)).
11 Stegovec uses the term ‘generalized obviation’.
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b. Pomagaj!
help.IMP.2
–
–
Pomagajte!
Help.IMP.2Pl
–
–
Pomagajmo!
Help.IMP.1Pl(Incl)
‘Help!’ – to more than to people: ‘Help!’ – ‘Let’s help!’
c. Naj
SBJV
pomaga!
help.3
–
–
Naj
SBJV
pomagajo!
help.3Pl
‘(S)he should help!’ – ‘They should help!’
In information seeking interrogatives, subjects whose referents include the ad-
dressee(s) (including first person plural inclusive) are unacceptable:
(14) Interrogative: anyone but second person.
a. Naj
SBJV
pomagam?
help.1
–
–
Naj
SBJV
pomagamo?
help.1PL
‘Should I help?’ – ‘Should we (not including you) help?’
b. *Pomagaj?
help.IMP2
–
–
*Pomagajte?
Help.IMP.2Pl
–
–
*Pomagajmo?
Help.IMP.1Pl(Incl)
int.: ‘Should { you(sg) you(pl) we (including you) } help?’
c. Naj
SBJV
pomaga?
help.3
–
–
Naj
SBJV
pomagajo?
help.3Pl
‘Should (s)he help?’ – ‘Should they help?’
For embedded occurrences, the matrix attitude holder becomes decisive: directives
are unacceptable if this is who their subject refers to. The general schema for the
embedded case is given in (15), an example for the second person case in (16).
(15) Embedded directive: anyone but attitude holder.
a. I said that *I/you/he should. . .
b. You said that I/*you/he should . . .
c. (S)hei said (to Y) that I/you/(s)he∗i/ j should. . .
(16) *Rekel
said.M
sii,
are.2
da
that
vecˇ
more
telovadii.
exercise.IMP.(2)
int.: ‘You said that you should exercise more.
Stegovec (2019) argues convincingly that these constraints are grammatical in nature:
‘An objection one could raise here is that the coreference ban is not a grammatical
effect—it is merely odd in most cases to tell or remind oneself what to do, so
reporting such cases should be likewise odd. [. . . ] does not hold up mainly because
[. . . ] scenarios of this kind can be reported felicitously—just not using imperatives
or subjunctives.’ (Stegovec 2019: emphasis mine) Imagine you hear me proclaim ‘I
should exercise more!’. Then, while you can’t use (16) to remind me, you can very
well use (17):
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(17) Rekel
said.M
sii,
are.2
da
that
moraši
should.2
vecˇ
more
telovadit.
exercise.INF
‘Youi said that youi should exercise more.’
Stegovec concludes that the problem is grammatical in nature, and in fact, syntactic.
In the following, I argue that he is right in seeing it as grammatically encoded,
however, I suggest that the effect arises for semantic reasons: in a nutshell, while
telling oneself to do something (and reporting such an utterance) is perfectly possible,
such a situation is incompatible with conventionally encoded requirements for the
felicitous use of directives. But before considering his account and developing a
semantic alternative, I place directive obviation in the broader context of related
linguistic phenomena that also inform Stegovec’s account.
3.2 Implications and comparable patterns
Directive obviation emerges as a pattern where grammar bans reference of a direc-
tive’s subject to the speaker (in a matrix directive clauses), the addressee (in matrix
interrogatives), and the referent of the matrix subject (in embedded directives). With
this, it looks like an instance of a series of phenomena that have been taken to de-
pend on a perspective holder that varies between utterance speaker in the base case,
addressee in interrogatives, and referent of the matrix subject in attitude or speech
reports. The change in dependency between matrix declaratives and interrogatives
specifically is known as interrogative flip. Speas & Tenny (2003) adduce a long
list of phenomena including epistemic modals, Japanese experiencer predicates,
and speech act adverbials. Another phenomenon they mention is conjunct-disjunct
marking as found in Kathmandu Newari; this consists in verbal subject agreement
that distinguishes between subjects referring to the perspectival center (determined
according to the lines described) in contrast to any other individual (Hale 1980;
Wechsler 2018; Zu 2018).
Speas & Tenny provide an account for the interaction between perspective de-
pendence and clause type that relates illocutionary forces to syntactic configurations.
They argue that speaker, hearer, and perspectival center (the ‘seat of knowledge’,
the individual “who can evaluate, or process, or comment on the truth of a proposi-
tion”, p. 332) are represented in specifier and argument positions of two functional
heads relating to speech act and evidence, respectively. Clause types differ in where
speaker and addressee are realized in the structure and what the seat of knowledge
is coindexed with: in matrix declaratives, it is the representation of the speaker; in
matrix interrogatives, of the addressee; in clauses embedded under verba dicendi
and sentiendi, the matrix subject (denoting the attitude holder). Speas & Tenny
(also Alcázar & Saltarelli 2014) intend the speech act related projections in the left
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clausal periphery as improved versions of Ross’s (1970) performative hypothesis,
which analyzes clause types as surface versions of the corresponding explicitly
performative construction (exemplified in (18) and (19)).
(18) a. You are reading this book.
b. I assert that you are reading this book.
(19) a. Read this book.
b. I order you to read this book.
The classical explicit performative hypothesis is bevexed by a series of problems,
most prominently incorrect truth-conditions (compare (18a) and (18b)) and overly
specific illocutionary forces (for instance, (19a) could just as well be used for
advising rather than ordering). Speas & Tenny argue that their version avoids these
issues while retaining the explanation for why utterance speaker and subjects of
speech and attitude reports play analogous roles for perspective dependent items in
matrix and embedded clauses, respectively.
When comparing the pattern of directive obviation to other perspective sensitive
phenomena, it stands out that what we considered the base case (matrix clauses
sensitive to the utterance speaker) are directives in the former but declaratives used
for assertions for the latter. Intuitively, this does reflect a unified understanding
of perspective sensitivity: what Speas & Tenny (2003) consider the perspective
holder (seat of knowledge) for epistemic modals, evidentials, taste predicates, and
the like seems to correspond to the director as the person knowledgeable about
whatever criteria underly the choice of action promoted for a directive.12 Similarly,
for interrogatives with directive subjunctive or imperative marking on the main verb,
it is the addressee who is asked what course of actions to select, suggesting that the
addressee is granted epistemic authority about what is the best choice of action.
When focusing only on embedded directive subjunctives (ignoring embedded
second person imperatives for the moment), directive obviation is an instance of
subject obviation as familiar from subjunctive marked complement clauses for
instance in Romance languages or in Hungarian. Subjunctives under verbs of
directing and desiring are well-known to disallow co-reference between matrix and
embedded subject (for an overview, see Quer 2006).13
12 Speas & Tenny (2003) argue for a syntactic structure that links the seat of knowledge in imperative
clauses to the addressee as the indidvidual that is “responsible for realizing the unrealized (nonfinite)
proposition”, (p. 335). In light of the pattern of directive obviation, I take it that, on their account, the
seat of knowledge should be linked to the speaker instead, just as it is in a declarative clause.
13 Stegovec (2019) is the first to extend this paradigm to include embedded imperatives (and matrix
interrogatives), but Kempchinsky (2009) already notices the parallel between the lack of first person
(exclusive) imperatives and subject obviation in subjunctive marked complement clauses (which she
calls quasi-imperatives).
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(20) [ SUBJi { want, hope, insist, . . . } [ SUBJ j,∗i . . . VERBSubjunctive . . . ]]
(21) a. Je
I
veux
want
partir.
leave.INF
‘I want to leave.’ Ruwet (1984)
b. *Je
I
veux
want
que
that
je
I
parte.
leave.SUBJ
Most of the existing literature adopts one of the following two approaches. First,
subjunctives can be seen to compete with constructions like (21a) that are struc-
turally simpler (e.g. Bouchard 1983) or encode additional conventional meaning
(e.g. responsibility for the course of events, Farkas 1985, or that the attitude is held
de se Schlenker 2005). For desiderative and directive matrix verbs, Kempchinsky
(2009) argues that a blocking account fails to account for the absence of comparable
obviation effects with object control verbs. For Slovenian embedded directives, Ste-
govec (2019) rejects a blocking account mostly for the lack of a suitable competitor
and because it is unclear how to extend it to the constraints observed with matrix
clauses. Second, authors have tried to reduce subject obviation to a Condition B
effect, that is, an anti-locality effect between embedded and matrix subject. The
restriction, would, for instance, fall out from independently motivated assumptions
if in the relevant cases of embedded subjunctive clauses, the binding domain of the
embedded subject is extended to include the matrix subject. Accounts differ widely
in what exactly triggers such a domain extension and are, accordingly, susceptible to
different sorts of criticisms. The main syntactic issue for any such account is that the
conflict arises solely between the two subjects. Kempchinsky (2009) proposes a third
type of solution that relies on obligatory binding by what she calls an anti-logophoric
element. She does not spell out the details of the anti-logophoric binding, but a
full-fledged solution along these lines would likely amount to a semantic account of
subject obviation. In the following, I propose a different, but explicitly semantic-
pragmatic account for directive obviation, and I conclude with a brief discussion of
how to extend it to subject obviation for subjunctive clauses under desiderative and
directive predicates in general. Before going into this, I discuss Stegovec’s (2019)
syntactic solution, which crucially informs my discussion and, as the sole existing
account for directive obviation overall, should serve as baseline.
3.3 A syntactic account for directive obviation
Inspired by binding-theoretic accounts of subject obviation, Stegovec (2019) pro-
poses a syntactic account of directive obviation. He argues that in directive clauses
the director is represented syntactically as perspectival PRO. Analogously to obli-
gatorily controlled PRO in the subject position of infinitival attitude complements,
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perspectival PRO is bound by a speech act operator COMMIT (in matrix directives
and matrix declaratives) or QUESTION (in matrix interrogatives), or by the matrix
predicate (in speech reports). This results in identificaiton with speaker, addressee or
matrix subject referent.14 The binding domain of the subject contains perspectival
PRO, and directive obviation is explained as a Condition B violation:
(22) Directive obviation in (22a) matrix and (22b) embedded clauses:
a. {COMMITSp, QUESTIONAddr} λx [ PROx [ SUBJECT [ . . . ]]]
b. [ SUBJECT said that [ λx [ PROx [ SUBJECT [ . . . ] ]]]]
For the interpretation, Stegovec adopts the proposal that imperatives express priori-
tizing modality (Kaufmann 2012, 2016; see Sect. 5.1), but assumes that the relevant
modal operator contains a slot for an individual argument that reflects the source
of the rules, desires, etc. that the directive clause is based on. This slot is filled by
perspectival PRO. In the following, I draw on the idea that directive obviation results
from identity between the person directing and the referent of the directive clauses’s
subject, but I consider it a semantic conflict and not an issue with the representation.
My motivation to search for a semantic solution that is sensitive to contextual as-
sumptions is twofold: (i) with imperatives, some of the unacceptable configurations
are predicted to be infelicitous already based on independently motivated semantic
assumptions, (ii) (directive) obviation effects are sensitive to functional differences
and contextual assumptions whose representation in the syntactic structure is not
obviously motivated. In Section 4, I highlight a series of phenomena that exemplify
this second claim, before developing the semantic solution in Section 5.2.
4 Contextual assumptions affect obviation effects
Independently of technical details specific to individual syntactic accounts of sub-
ject obviation, the effect’s susceptibility to semantic or pragmatic phenomena is
problematic for any such attempt (Farkas 1992). In the following, I discuss a list
of phenomena that affect perspective sensitivity in general and subject obviation in
particular. The fact that most of them also impact canonical imperatives corroborates
the status of the latter as part of the directive paradigm.
14 The speech act operators are adopted from Pearson (2013), who uses ASSERT and QUESTION which
combine with properties and impose felicity constraints on which discourse participant commits to a
property by self-ascription (the speaker of an ASSERT-modified sentence), or is supposed to truthfully
self-ascribe one of a set of properties (the addressee of a QUESTION-modified sentence).
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4.1 Tampering with interrogative flip
In matrix interrogatives, sensitivity to the speaker (as observed in the base case) is
normally replaced by sensitivity to the addressee, resulting in obviation effects for
second person subjects. However, there are a series of exceptions.
First, Stegovec (2017) observes that Slovenian imperatives (i.e., second person
directives) are felicitous in scope marking questions that can shift information
seeking questions. As in English (23), the interpretation of (24) is similar to the
corresponding long distance extraction out of an attitude or speech report (Dayal
1994):
(23) What does John think? Where is Mary?
≈Where does John think that Mary is?
(24) Kaj
what
je
AUX.3
rekla?
said.F
Kaj
what
kupi?
buy.IMP(2)
‘What did she say? What should you buy?’
≈ ‘What did she say that you should buy?’
While unacceptable on its own, Kaj kupi? (lit. ‘What buy.IMP?’) is felicitous
when following an interrogative about what someone said. Inuitively, the second
interrogative is interpreted in the scope of the speech report mentioned in the first,
and similarly to what happens in speech reports, the individual relevant for obviation
effects is not the utterance addressee (as in regular interrogatives) but the subject of
the first interrogative.
Second, Oikonomou (2016) shows that the infelicity of Greek na-subjunctives
with second person subjects in matrix interrogatives can be overcome by contextual
settings. (25a) becomes felicitous in a context where speaker and addressee are
supposed to decide together, or a third party (e.g. the mother) has already made the
decision; (25b) explicitly introduces the non-participant opinion holder.
(25) a. Ti
what
na
SUBJ
fas
eat.2
avrio?
tomorrow?
‘What could you eat tomorrow?’ deciding together
b. Ti
What
gnomi
opinion
ehi
has
i
the
mama?
mom
Na
SUBJ
pas
go.2
sto
at-the
parti?
party
‘What’s your mom’s opinion? Can/Should you go to the party?’
Third, rhetorical questions affect the usual pattern of perspectival sensitivity. Hale
(1980: 100) observes that in Newari, rhetorical questions behave like declaratives for
the purpose of subject agreement. That is, verbs agreeing with first person subjects
carry conjunct agreement and verbs agreeing with any non-first person noun phrase
carry disjunct marking. And, indeed, some languages seem to allow imperative
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morphology in rhetorical wh-questions. Wilson & Sperber (1988) report this for
Omotic (spoken in Southern Ethiopia), without, however, providing examples.
Kaufmann & Poschmann (2013) find that in some colloquial varieties of German,
imperatives can occur in rhetorical wh-questions:
(26) Wo
where
stell
put.IMP
den
the
Blumentopf
flower.pot
(schon)
DISCPART
hin?
VERBPART
%German
‘Come on, where should you put that flower pot? (It’s obvious.)’
Fourth, canonical imperatives and surrogates with second person subjects can oc-
cur with rising intonation, which serves to turn them into suggestions (Schwager
2006: 201; Portner 2018; Rudin 2018):
(27) a. Help him (maybe)?
b. Pomagaj?
help.IMP.2
Slovenian
‘Should you help?’
c. {Procˇitaj
read.IMP2
/
/
Da
that
procˇitaš}
read.2.Pfv
ovu
this
knjigu?
book
Serbian
‘Read this book, maybe?’
Rudin (2018) offers an analysis in which the rising tune signals the absence of
speaker commitment; the prejacent of the imperative is proposed as a possible action
commitment. Intuitively, in these cases, neither speaker nor addressee alone have
sufficient knowledge to determine what is best; the speaker appears to suggest that
information should be pooled.
4.2 Lack of control
Ungrammaticality due to subject obviation is alleviated if the referent of the two
subjects is taken to lack control over the course of events described in the complement
(Ruwet 1984; Farkas 1988, 1992; Szabolcsi 2010). This has been observed amongst
other with non-agentive complements (e.g. (28a)) and actions that are controlled
jointly with others (e.g. (28b)); Szabolcsi (2010) subsumes effects of focus on the
embedded subject under the case of joint control.15
15 The cases discussed involve mostly desire predicates, as directive predicates tend to lexically indicate
that the person talked to is (taken to be) in control. However, directive predicates like insist can be
shown to have similar effects (Kempchinsky 2009):
(i) %[La ministra]i insiste en que ELLAi/[ella misma]i presida la sesión.
‘The minister insists that SHE/she herself chair.SUBJ the session.’ Spanish, (her 11d)
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(28) a. Je
I
veux
want
que
that
je
I
sois
be.SUBJ.1
très
very
amusant
amusing
ce
this
soir.
night
‘I want for me to be quite amusing tonight. Ruwet 1989:(68a)
b. Je
I
veux
want
que
that
tu
you
partes
leave.SUBJ.2
et
and
que
that
je
I
reste.
stay.SUBJ.1
‘I want for you to go and for me to stay.’ Ruwet 1989:(49)
Oikonomou (2016: (38)) observes that directive na-subjunctives in Greek, which
display the directive obviation effect, are sensitive to contextually presumed control.
She describes (29) to be acceptable when uttered by a person without an alarm to
their mother who is known to get up early independently (A. Stegovec, p.c., shares
these judgments for Slovenian naj-subjunctives):
(29) Avrio
Tomorrow
na
SUBJ
ksipniso
wake.1SG
stis
at
6:00am.
6:00am.
‘Tomorrow I should wake up at 6:00am.’
Here, too, obviation with respect to the utterance speaker is alleviated once they are
not presumed to be in control over the course of events described by the prejacent.16
4.3 A question of interface
The previous two sections have shown that directive obviation in matrix and embed-
ded contexts is sensitive to contextual presumptions about who is knowledgeable
about, or in charge of, the content of the relevant rules, and who can control the
course of events selected. Such distinctions are not normally taken to be reflected
in the syntactic structure. For instance, rhetorical questions have been argued to
be structurally regular interrogatives used in contexts incompatible with speaker
ignorance (Rohde 2006; Caponigro & Sprouse 2007). Similarly, it is not obvious
in what sense contextually presumed control over a course of events is encoded
grammatically. Consequently, while directive obviation itself seems to be gram-
matical in that it is tied to the forms of imperatives and directive subjunctives, the
parameters it is sensitive to do not appear to be determined by syntax or semantics
16 It may not be possible to replicate this effect with canonical second person imperatives, which are
sometimes taken to conventionally encode that the subject (the addressee) is in control of the course
of events under consideration (Farkas 1988). This, however is too strong; imperatives are compatible
with the lack of control when used for wishes:
(i) a. Please be there already! silent wish, while running to a meeting
b. Please don’t have broken another vase! Culicover & Jackendoff (1997)
For reasons unknown to me, at least in German and in Slovenian (Adrian Stegovec, p.c.), wish
readings seem unavailable for embedded imperatives and for imperative marking in interrogatives.
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alone.17 In light of these considerations, I would like to explore the possibilities of a
semantic-pragmatic account for directive obviation.
5 Directive obviation as a semantic conflict
The account of directive obviation developed in the following returns to the idea of
directive clauses (canonical and surrogate imperatives) as associated with directive
speech acts: they are ear-marked for use by a director d to influence actions of
an instigator a in favor of a making true the prejacent φ . For a second person
imperative in canonical use, the director is the utterance speaker and the instigator a
is the utterance addressee.
Intuitively, directive speech acts require particular contextual constellations, and
building on my earlier work (Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012, 2016), I assume that
imperatives carry conventional meaning that allows for them to be used felicitously
in such but not other contexts. Thereby, these requirements derive the inherently non-
descriptive (non-assertive) character of imperatives (and other directives). Generally,
directive speech acts with content p can be performed only if (i) d does not take
p for granted; in the semantics of the imperative, this surfaces as the Epistemic
Uncertainty Condition (EUC); and (ii) d possesses the relevant authority; in the
semantics of the imperative, this surfaces as a combination of Epistemic Authority
Condition (EAC) and Decisive Modality (DM). The main idea of the semantic-
pragmatic account for directive obviation is that the conventional meaning expressed
by directive clauses with the respective subject settings is at odds with the contextual
requirements for the felicitous use of a directive. In Sect. 5.1, I introduce the account
of second person imperatives in canonical uses and its extension to other occurrences
of directives, in Sect. 5.2, I show how the account derives the obviation effects, and
in Sect. 5.3, I explore how particular settings can alleviate them.
5.1 The modal operator theory: Imperatives as modalized propositions
Declarative sentences containing deontic modals are known to be amenable to both
descriptive and performative uses; they can describe what is permitted, commanded,
recommended, and so on (descriptive), but they can also be used for speech acts
like permissions, commands, or recommendations that change matters of that kind
(performative); (Kamp 1973, 1978). For instance, I can use (30a) to report to a
friend what I have just heard from their sibling, and I can use (30b) to pass on to my
17 Szabolcsi (2010) shows, however, that presumed absence of control rescues positive polarity items
in the scope of negated desire predicates. Zu (2018) analyzes this by letting phasehood depend on
presumed control, the syntactic status of which she sees corroborated by its impact on conjunct-
disjunct marking.
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husband what I’ve been told by the manager of the hotel who is setting out bowls of
fruit. However, I can also use (30a) to get my husband to call my mother-in-law, or
(30b) to give my son permission to take an apple.
(30) a. You have to call your mother.
b. You may take an apple.
Evidence for one or the other type of use comes from the respective (in)felicity of
reacting to the move with That’s (not) true!, or a follow-up by the same speaker with
but I absolutely don’t want you to do this. Both can be felicitous with descriptive, but
are infelicitous with performative uses. Cross-linguistically, it appears to be common
for modals to do duble duty in this sense, and a pragmatic analysis has become
standard (e.g. Schulz 2005). The distinction between descriptive and performative is
thus between different types of usages of one and the same lexical item.
The main motivation for the modal operator theory18 is that imperatives are
similar to declaratives with performatively used modals, patterning together for
instance with respect to the aforementioned follow-ups. Imperatives, however, lack
descriptive uses. If, as the pragmatic analysis would have it, it is the context that
decides if a modal verb is used descriptively (descriptive context) or performatively
(performative context), and imperatives are supposed to at some level be interpreted
just like modal verbs, then imperatives have to be banned from occurring in de-
scriptive contexts. To achieve this, it is assumed that imperatives contain a covert
modal operator OPImp that is interpreted like have to or should at the level of at-issue
meaning, but triggers a series of presuppositions that can be met by performative,
but not by descriptive contexts.19 Modulo presuppositional meaning, we obtain
equivalences as in (31):
(31) [[Clean up your desk!]] ≈ [[You must/should clean up your desk.]]
To spell out the details of the analysis, I translate natural language to standard modal
logic with unary operators  and ♦ indexed for different epistemic and prioritizing
interpretations. Interpretation proceeds with respect to a frame F = 〈W,D,B,R〉,
where W is a set of possible worlds, D a set of individuals including speaker S and
18 Proposed in Schwager 2006 and elaborated further in Kaufmann 2012; Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2012;
Kaufmann 2016.
19 For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that the operator is of universal quantificational force.
This is an oversimplification: First, Medeiros (2013) argues that necessity as conveyed by imperatives
is weak (≈ should, ought) rather than strong (≈ must, have to). Second, necessity readings of
imperatives are either in alternation with possibility readings or result from exhaustifying possibility
(you can’t do anything else but ≈ you must), see Kaufmann 2012, Grosz 2009, Oikonomou 2016,
and Francis t.a. for discussion. I will leave it to future research to evaluate the proposal presented in
this paper against the foil of potential variability in quantificational force.
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addressee A, B maps any contextually relevant individual x to x’s belief relation
Bx ⊆W ×W (serial, shift-reflexive, and transitive),20 and R⊆W ×W is the salient
prioritizing modal flavor. I employ two belief operators with interpretations derived
from B:
(32) a. Mutual joint belief CG, which is indexed for interpretation with
respect to the transitive closure of BS∪BA (Stalnaker 2002).
b. Public Belief: Individual x is publicly committed to believing p:
PBx p := CGBx p.
The context set CS is the set of possible worlds compatible with mutual joint belief
at the world in which the utterance takes place.
Imperatives and modalized sentences are translated as in (33) (where R in the
object language abbreviates sensitivity to the salient prioritizing necessity; this is
determined conventionally for imperatives):
(33) If φ translates to p,
a. mustRφ translates to R p
b. imperative φ ! (also: OPImpφ ) translates to R p
Kaufmann (2012) argues that performative contexts are characterized by the fact that
the salient prioritizing modality enjoys a special status in the context of the conver-
sation (Decisive Modality, DM), the speaker is considered knowledgeable about this
modal flavor (Epistemic Authority Condition, EAC), and the speaker is assumed to
consider the prejacent possible but not take it for granted (at least not independently
of this very imperative utterance itself; Epistemic Uncertainty Condition, EUC).21
To get the connection between linguistic expressions and speech acts off the ground,
I assume that uttering a proposition-denoting object by default commits the speaker
to publicly believing it and taking any presuppositions conventionally associated
with it to be either mutual joint belief or uncontroversial enough to be accommodated
(for assumptions along these lines see Portner 2005; Schwager 2006; Kaufmann
2012; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; Lauer 2013). I assume that uttering a sentence
translated as, and hence committing the speaker to, Rφ or ♦Rφ amounts to a speech
act other than an assertion in a context that (regarding R) meets the characteristics
captured by DM, EAC, and EUC. While performative modals allow, but do not
require, a speaker to presuppose these conditions, imperatives conventionally force
the speaker to presuppose them. Consequently, if the conditions cannot reasonably
be presupposed, imperatives result infelicitous; if they are met, imperatives result in
20 A relation R is shift-reflexive iff for any w, w′ s.t. wRw′, also w′Rw′. This ensures that the individuals
believe to not have wrong beliefs, but allows from them to be actually mistaken.
21 For simplicity, I am setting aside expressive imperatives, see Fn. 16.
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some non-assertive speech act.22
Building on the characterizations of decisive modality and decision problem in
(34) and (35), DM, EAC, and EUC are spelled out as follows:
(34) A set of propositions ∆ is a decision problem for an agent a in a context
c iff ∆ partitions the context set CSc and CSc entails that for all q ∈ ∆,
CONTROL(a,q) (where CONTROL(a,q) := TRY(a,q)→ q).
(DM) Decisive Modality: Given context set CS and a salient partition ∆ on CS,
the salient modal flavor R is decisive iff it constitutes the contextually
agreed upon criteria to choose between the cells of ∆.
(35) R being the decisive modality implies for any participant a to the conversa-
tion: Kaufmann & Kaufmann (2012)
a. If Rq, a does not have an effective preference against q.23
b. If ∆ is a decision problem for a, a tries to find out if Rq for any q ∈ ∆.
c. If ∆ is a decision problem for a and a learns that Rq for q ∈ ∆, a tries
to realize q.
(EAC) Epistemic Authority Condition: The speaker has perfect knowledge of R:
for any p ∈ ∆: R p↔BSR p.
(EUC) Epistemic Uncertainty Condition (EUC): In uttering a sentence translated
as R p, speaker S holds possible both p and ¬p: ♦BS p∧♦BS¬p
Imperative marking triggers DM, EAC, and EUC as presuppositions, which means
that the speaker takes them to be entailed by the context set by the time the content
of his utterance is used to update the context set (Stalnaker 2002). Beyond the base
case of canonical second person imperatives in matrix clauses, directive marking can
occur in questions or speech reports (Sections 2 and 3). Therefore, the requirements
that, so far, were stated about the speaker and the addressse, have to be generalized
to director and instigator (which, in the canonical case, happen to be the speaker and
the addressee, respectively).
(36) a. The director has epistemic authority (EAC) and uncertainty (EUC).
b. If ∆ is a decision problem for agent a, then a is the instigator associated
with the reported or actual speech act the directive clause is used for.
Speakers of directive clauses in utterance events e presuppose these conditions
about the context of e. In speech reports, the presupposition can be bound to the
22 For detailed derivations of command-like imperatives, see Kaufmann 2016.
23 Where effective preference is understood in the sense of Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) as preferences
that are ranked so as to be mutually consistent on the agent’s belief state, who uses them to determine
his choices of action.
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corresponding parameters of the reported event (Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015). By
presupposing them, speakers using directive clauses become publicly committed
to believing that EAC, EUC, and DM are mutual joint belief. We can now use this
effect to explain directive obviation as a clash in discourse commitments.
5.2 Accounting for directive obviation at the semantics pragmatic interface
From the presuppositional meaning of directive clauses, we can derive the principle
of Director’s Anticipation in (37); the proof is given in (38):
(37) Director’s Anticipation: If director d is publicly committed to believing
that instigator a believes that p ∈ ∆ is R-necessary, then d is publicly
committed to believing that p will come true: PBdBaR p→PBd p
(38) a. PBdBaR p Assumption
b. PBd(BaR p→ TRY(a, p)) Decisive Modality
c. PBdBaR p→ PBd TRY(a, p) K
d. PBd TRY(a, p) 1, 3, MP
e. PBd p presumed control (decision problem)
Let’s first consider the case of unembedded directives in their prototypical directive
use. In line with Searle’s definition of directive speech acts, the role of the director is
played by the utterance speaker and, in the unmarked case, the instigator appears as
the grammatical subject. In this case, a first person subject results in identity between
director and instigator. The descriptive characterization of directive obviation tells
us that this is excluded (universally, languages appear to lack designated first person
singular imperative forms, and surrogate forms like Slovenian naj-subjunctives
cannot be used to close this gap in the paradigm). The theory proposed here does
indeed predict such cases to be inherently contradictory, see (39):
(39) a. PBdR p Committing utterance by d
b. PBdBdR p Def. of PB
c. PBd p b, Director’s Anticipation
d. PBd(♦PBd p∧♦PBd¬p) EUC
e. ¬PBd p d, System K
f. PBd p∧¬PBd p c,e: E
With embedded directives, following general preferences of presupposition resolu-
tion (van der Sandt 1992), we expect the requirements the directive imposes to regard
the reported utterance context.24 Imperatives and directives are found embedded
24 Qua presuppositions, they could in principle also project to the main context or be accommodated
locally to avoid inconsistency. It remains to be seen to what extent this is indeed a possibility, or else,
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under speech act verbs that can describe directive speech acts (like say, tell, order,
etc.). By the semantics of these embedding predicates, the matrix subject has to be
the director of the reported speech event. If, however, the director is also the referent
of the subject and considered the instigator in the context that is being described
by the matrix predicate, the restrictions imposed on the reported context are just
the same conflicting ones we have derived for the actual utterance context in the
committing matrix case, resulting in the infelicity of the schemata in (40):
(40) a. *I said that I should. . .
b. *You said that { you should , V.IMP.2p }. . .
c. (S)hei said that (s)he j,∗i should. . .
In matrix interrogatives, conflicting requirements arise with an addressee denoting
subject. Descriptively, this patterns with other phenomena that are subject to inter-
rogative flip (see Sect. 4.1). At the theoretical level, it prompts us to reconsider the
role of the director. Information seeking interrogatives are not used for directive
speech acts, in that sense, no individual aims to impose restrictions on anyone by the
utterance carried out with the interrogative containing the directive form. However,
if we take serious the idea that the contextual requirements imposed by whatever
licenses imperative morphology or directive subjunctives are presuppositions, we
would assume that, like other presuppositions, they project. Clearly, the requirement
that the speaker be knowledgable is at odds with the settings for information seeking
questions. By looking at how the presuppositions characterize the director in the
matrix declarative case, it turns out that the individual that can naturally fulfill these
requirements in the context of an information seeking question is the addressee. In
line with the expectation from Director’s Anticipation that directive obviation results
typically when director and matrix subject referent are the same, directive obviation
results with addressee referring subjects in (information-seeking) interrogatives
(*Go.IMP/Should you go?).
Unlike declaratives, interrogatives do not commit the actual speaker to believing
a proposition expressed (as, typically, interrogatives are not taken to express propo-
sitions). However, information seeking questions are typically taken to commit a
speaker to consider possible more than one or maybe even all semantic answers. For
an interrogative expressing the semantics answers in (41a),25 we can reason that the
in what ways combinations of shiftable and unshiftable indexicality in the parameters referenced by
the directive semantics (for discussion, see Pak et al. 2008; Kaufmann & Poschmann 2013; Stegovec
& Kaufmann 2015) prevent alternative resolutions along these lines.
25 Under the assumption that the directive has to resolve the decision problem, I assume that the negative
answer ¬R p is strengthened to R¬p. If this assumption is not made, the second disjunct would
be consistent as long as ¬p does not name a cell in the decision problem (if it does, EAC leads to
inconsistency here, too). But the speaker of an information seeking interrogative can not felicitously
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speaker commits to holding possible their disjunction (cf. (41b)); moreover, they
commit to the presuppositions associated with the directive (cf. (41c)). By the laws
of standard modal logic, we derive that the speaker is committed to a contradiction.
(41) a. {R p,R¬p} Semantic answers
b. PBS(R p∨R¬p) Interrogative commitment
c. PBS(R p↔BAR p)∧ PBS(♦BA p∧♦BA¬p) EAC, EUC
d. PBS((R p∧BAR p∧♦BA¬p)∨ (R¬p∧BAR¬p∧♦BA p))
b,c; EAC
The obviating constellation is predicted correctly to be at odds with the felicitous
use of a directive in an information seeking question.
5.3 Obviating directive obviation
The proofs that serve to explain unacceptability rely on identification of the director
with the referent of the grammatical subject who is also the instigator: the individual
that is taken to be able to, and directed to, bring about the relevant course of events.
There are, however, various ways of breaking these links (that are compatible
with the conventional semantics of the directive marking). In line with what is
expected on the basis of a semantic-pragmatic account, the directive obviation effect
goes away (cf. Sect. 4). The challenge is now to fit these phenomena into the
formal framework. First, scope marking questions change the parameters of what
amounts to directive obviation. If they behave sufficiently like speech reports for
semantic and pragmatic purposes (Dayal 1994), the switch in sensitivity falls out
from the account proposed for embedded directives. Oikonomou’s (2016) data
on Greek na-subjunctives suggest that the parameter of the director can also be
set to a contextually salient point of view. Second, while languages do not allow
second person imperatives in information seeking questions, imperatives with rising
intonation can serve for (tentative) suggestions. In these cases, no obviation results
for second person (similarly to declaratives), yet, the speaker can be, and can present
themself as being, genuinely insecure of whether this is the best option. This means
however, that they cannot be the director, else the Epistemic Authority Condition
would be violated. It seems reasonable to assume that, for one thing, rising intonation
marks a question-like move in that the speaker does not commit to believing the
proposition they express (no epistemic commitment to R p results, Rudin 2018).
Moreover, the speaker presents themself as sharing epistemic authority with the
addressee, in that they together figure out what the right solution is. Technically, the
commit herself to holding possible only a single answer (the consistent one). The obviation effect is
thus predicted independently of the presumed strengthening in (41a).
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idea that speaker and addressee together count as the director can be made sense of if
EAC is evaluated w.r.t. distributed belief , defined as in (42a). Even though neither
of the participants alone has enough information to settle the decision problem, it
can be solved if the information they hold separately is pooled:
(42) a. RDBS,A := BS∩BA (Fagin, Halpern, Vardi & Moses 1995)
b. EAC: DBS,AR p↔R p
Assuming that the instigator is the addressee, director and instigator are no longer
equivalent, so there is no Director’s Anticipation (R p can be distributed knowledge
between speaker and addressee, without the addressee, the instigator, knowing).
No inconsistent discourse commitments are predicted. Third, the account looks
promising also for rhetorical questions. In line with what was said above, they seem
to be used in contexts where, as with declaratives or regular directives, epistemic
authority resides with the speaker. If so, the speaker counts as the director and no
obviation is expected for second person cases, i.e. canonical imperative marking.
In Sect. 4.2 we have seen that lack of control is another case that allows for subject
obviation to be voided. Specifically, if the director is not committed to assuming that
the matrix subject has control over the prejacent, the presumption that the subject
knows what is necessary does not give rise to the inference that the prejacent will be
realized. Consequently, no director’s anticipation is derived. However, cases along
these lines are complicated by two phenomena: (i) matrix predicates describing
directive speech acts tend to lexically encode that their subject ascribes control to
the object (the addressee of the speech act described), (ii) canonical second person
imperatives appear to differ from other directive forms in the ease with which they
can be used in contexts where the subject lacks control (cf. Fn. 16). I will leave it to
further research to explore the impact of presumed lack of control on the directive
obviation effect.
6 Conclusions
I have argued that canonical second person imperatives can form part of a larger
class of directive clauses which all express a particular type of prioritizing modality.
The modality in question relies on a director who selects courses of events as optimal
in a given contextual setting but cannot control them and is not sure that they will
be realized. With this, a directive utterance carried out, or reported, with a directive
clause is a (presumed) expert’s attempt to ensure the realization of the course of
events they recognize as best based on contextually salient criteria; an interrogative
containing a directive seeks to extract such an attempt from an expert. In this sense,
directives grammaticalize a gap between (presumed) expert knowledge and practical
powers (control of the world as such). Cases with prejacents where the director
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appears as the agentive subject are typically at odds with the requirement that the
director does not yet know whether the prejacent will get realized. This effect lies at
the heart of directive obviation, which materializes itself in the absence of first person
exclusive imperative forms, the ungrammaticality of canonical imperative marking
in information seeking interrogatives, as well as subject obviation for embedded
directives. Directive obviation thus provides evidence for the conventional encoding
of the director in imperatives and directive subjunctives. Since I propose to derive
the clash in terms of conflicting discourse commitments, the effect itself does not
provide evidence that the director has to be represented in the syntax. However,
in line with other phenomena of perspective sensitivity, we have to ensure that the
speaker (as the director in the base case) can be replaced by the addressee and
the referent of the matrix subject in interrogative formation and speech reports,
respectively. I will leave it to further research to settle the question whether this
sensitivity in perspective dependence in general can be derived without a syntactic
representation of the perspectival center.
The semantic-pragmatic proposal for directive obviation may have implications
for two cross-linguistic puzzles related to promising. First, Pak et al. (2008) ar-
gue that Korean imperatives, exhortatives, and promissives differ only in which
conversational participant they seek to commit to behave in a certain way: the ad-
dressee, addressee and speaker together, or the speaker. However, assimilating them
in this way, seems, as they observe, at odds with the cross-linguistic markedness
of promissives. On the account proposed here, promissives stand out in that they
grammaticalize identity rather than a gap between presumed expert knowledge and
presumed control (the director commits themself to act as indicated). In unmarked
contexts where agents are taken to be in control of their future actions, promissives
fail to signal a special effect over and above what could be achieved by a declarative.
In contrast, imperatives and exhortatives signal a difference between descriptive and
performative contexts. Second, the analysis of promissives as anti-obviating forms
may also shed light on a puzzle about lexical predicates of promising: such verbs
are predicted to select subjunctive by many theories of mood selection (given their
relation to preferential action courses or non-realization); yet, they stubbornly select
indicative complements (Zanuttini et al. 2012). If, as I assume, standard obviation
effects as associated with subjunctives embedded under directive and desiderative
predicates are instances of directive obviation, triggered by the particular semantics
of directives in the relevant constellations, then the subcategorization pattern for
verbs of promising falls out. More work needs to be done, however, to obtain a
full-fledged account of the composition of directive and in particular desiderative
matrix verbs with independently modalized complements containing this type of
obviative prioritizing modality (promising starting points can be found in Farkas
1988; Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009).
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